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RECENT DECISIONS
the business is unlawful if carried on within the jurisdiction of the
State of California and that issue was decided by the Supreme Court
of that state. In the Heininger case the court acknowledged that
Section 23(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 8 does not expressly
state that the business must be lawful for the deduction to apply but
also acknowledges that the language of Section 23 (a) has been, from
time to time, narrowly construed by the courts, "in order that tax
deduction consequences might not frustrate sharply defined national
or state policies prescribing particular types of conduct."
The Tax Court ruled that to permit those deductions, incurred
in an effort to perpetrate an illegal gambling business, would be con-
trary to public policy.
The expenditures made to the attorney in Washington are dis-
allowed on the authority of Textile Mills Securities Corporation v.
Commissioner9 wherein expenses incurred "for certain types of
lobbying and political pressure with a view to influencing federal
legislation" was denied.
The deduction claimed for "Public Relations" failed for lack of
proof of duties which were performed, the court indicating that if
such proof had been made the deductions would probably have fallen
under the Textile Mills case supra.
Other deductions claimed by Rex Operators and by the indi-
vidual taxpayers were disallowed. Considerations of space preclude
treatment of them in this article.
W. J. H.
LIBEL AND SLANDER - DEFAMATORY RADIO BROADCAST READ
FRom SCRIPT CONSTITUTES LIBEL, NOT MERELY SLANDER.-The
defendant during a broadcast, uttered defamatory statements con-
cerning the plaintiff. The words did not defame the plaintiff in his
professional capacity and consequently were not slanderous per se.
However, while making the defamatory remarks, the defendant read
from a script prepared in advance of the broadcast. In the action
the plaintiff alleged that the remarks were made while the defendant
read from a script and further alleged the loss of his teaching and
lecturing position with a subsequent loss to him of more than $7,000.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that
it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that
the general allegation that the plaintiff lost over $7,000 as a result
of defendant's remarks was not sufficiently specific to constitute an
SINT. REV. CoDE § 23(a) provides:
".. . All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business ... may be deducted from
gross income:
9 Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326, 86 L. ed. 249 (1942).
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allegation of special damage. Held, motion to dismiss the complaint
denied. The allegation that the remarks were read from a prepared
script, even if not sufficient to compose what is commonly termed a
libel, did state a good cause of action. In its opinion the court stated
that the defendant's utterance was libel, not slander, following prece-
dent in New York where reading defamatory matter contained in a
letter in the presence of a stranger is deemed a sufficient publication
to sustain an action for libel 1 and where reading defamatory matter
from a script during a radio broadcast is held to be libel.2  Hartman
v. Winchell, 296 N. Y. 296, 73 N. E. 20 (1947).
Mr. Justice Fuld, concurring in the instant case, declares that
the basis of liability for libel had its origin in two early seventeenth
century English criminal cases in the Court of the Star Chamber.
These actions were concerned with the prosecution for libel of certain
ecclesiastics, the purpose being to aid the crown in repressing allegedly
seditious speech.8 The broad rules of criminal liability are declared
by Mr. Justice Fuld to be of uncertain validity when applied to the
civil remedy developed at a later date, and that liability should be
sought on the grounds that sound policy requires such a result.
The action of defamation at the common law in the sixteenth
century embraced written as well as spoken words and the same rules
were applicable to both.4 The cause of action was based on the dam-
age sustained and not on the basis of the insult received.5 The courts
were concerned with material rights and not discipline.6  For this
very reason it was necessary to allege and prove special damages.7
This essential element was later relaxed in particular instances, as
where a crime was imputed to an innocent party, and damages in
those cases was presumed from the act itself.8
With the advent of the printing press, the Court of the Star
Chamber assumed control over printed matter because the effect of
defamation in the written form was to disturb the peace. 9 The ac-
2 Snyder v. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43 (N. Y. 1849).
2 Hryhorijiv v. Winchell, 180 Misc. 574, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 31 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
aff'd, 267 App. Div. 817, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 102 (1st Dep't 1944).
3 Di Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (K. B. 1605);
John Lamb's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 59b, 77 Eng. Rep. 822 (K. B. 1610).
4 Broughton's Case, Moore 141, 72 Eng. Rep. 493 (K. B. 1583) ; Ware v.
Johnson, 2 Lee 103, 161 Eng Rep. 279 (P. & D. 1755); Boughton v. Bishop,
1 Anderson 119, 123 Eng. Rep. 385 (C. P. 1584).
5 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 335, 365 (1926) ; 1 STPRET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 276, 278 (1906) ; 5 HoLnswoRTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 206 (1926).
6See Jones v. Jones, [1916] 2 A. C. 481, 490; Gallwey v. Marshall, 9 Ex.
294, 300, 156 Eng. Rep. 126, 128 (Ex. 1853) ; Veeder, The History and Theory
of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoL. L. Rxv. 571, 573 (1903).
7 Compagnon v. Martin, 2 W. B1. 790, 96 Eng. Rep. 465 (K. B. 1772).
88 HoLwswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 348 (1926); 1 STRET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 276, 277, 278 (1906) ; see also Jones v. Jones,
[1916] 2 A. C. 481, 490.9 See Jones v. Jones, [1916] 2 A. C. 481, 489; 5 HoLuswoRTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 207, 208, 209 (1926).
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tion for written defamation or libel, was a crime which carried with
it, in addition, general damages.' 0 The common law courts adopted
libel from the criminal libel of the Court of the Star Chamber which
was abolished by the Long Parliament. The necessity of proof of spe-
cial damages was dispensed with, and the writing itself made presump-
tive evidence of damage." The courts having allowed certain actions
in defamation to be maintained without proof of special damage, had
placed upon themselves the burden of deciding whether the defama-
tion was actionable per se. To relieve themselves in part of this bur-
den, they chose to deem any writing a defamation per se.'2 At this
time, too, dueling was a common and dangerous practice, and in order
to deter it, the courts considered defamation in writing as presump-
tive of damage 13 thus enticing the contestants away from the field
of honor and into the courts. The distinction between written and
non-written defamation was the product of policy 14 and not the result
of mere historical accident.' 5
Today various reasons are given for the distinction in form be-
tween libel and slander, 16 primary among them being the greater
capacity of libel for harm due to its wide range of dissemination con-
sequent upon its permanence in form.' 7 This is not necessarily true,
as is all too evident, but the distinction had been made as far back
as the time of Charles Il and has been recognized by the courts since
the early eighteenth century.' 8 Later cases have held that the verbal
exposition of the contents of a defamatory document is libel, at least
where the audience is aware of the existence of the manuscript 1 9 and
even where no such knowledge exists.20
10 See Jones v. Jones, [1916] 2 A. C. 481, 489; 5 HoLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 212 (1926).
I Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COL. L.
REv. 546, 568, 569 (1903); 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 292(1906).
22 King v. Lake, Hardres 470, 145 Eng. Rep. 552 (Ex. 1670).
Is 8 HoLnswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 353 (1926) 5HoswoRTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 199, 201 (1926).
14 See Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 39, 175 N. E. 505, 506 (1931).
IsSee Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 39, 175 N. E. 505, 506 (1931); 8 HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 365 (1926); 1 STREET, FouNDATIoNs OF
LEGAL LIABILITY 291, 292 (1906).
'
6 See Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225, 235, 23 L. ed. 308, 310 (1875).
"See Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524, 530; Ostrowe v. Lee 256 N. Y.
36, 39, 175 N. E. 505, 506 (1931); ZOLLXAN, LAW OF THE AIR 15 (1927);
Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COL. L. REv.
546, 571, 572 (1903) ; Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio,
19 MINN. L. REv. 611,641 (1934-35).
is Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355. 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (C. P. 1812).
19 Forrester v. Tyrrell, 9 T. L. R. 257 (C. A. 1893) ; Patching v. Howarth,
4 D. L. R. 489 (1930); Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505 (1931);
Lunn v. Littauer, 187 App. Div. 808, 175 N. Y. Supp. 657 (3d Dep't 1919);
Block v. Nussbaum, 160 App. Div. 678, 146 N. Y. Supp. 55 (1st Dep't 1914).
20 Johnson v. Hudson, 7 Ad. & E. 233, 112 Eng. Rep. 459 (K. B. 1836).
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The instant decision is in accord with the leading case outside
New York, Sorenson v. Wood,21 where the language was held libel-
ous because the speaker, while broadcasting, read his speech from a
script. Similar decisions have held that reading defamatory matter
aloud in the presence of others 22 or over the radio 23 is libel. Simi-
larly the Restatement 2 4 declares "A libel may be published by broad-
casting over the air by means of a radio if the speaker reads from a
prepared manuscript or speaks from written or printed notes or
memorandum." The distinction has long been established and main-
tained although the original reasons for the distinction have been
effaced and present efforts to supplant them with other reasons have
proven inadequate. However, the decision here might possibly be
sustained on other grounds, such as the original and fundamental
reason for all defamation actions--damage.25
The essence of libel is the capacity for damage.26 For deter-
mining such, the court should look to the substance of the injury and
not merely to the form. In modern times there are certain slan-
derous expressions which are actionable in themselves because the
natural consequences of what they impute to another is damage 27
in addition to the damage presumed from the mere fact a defamation
is in written form. "The area of dissemination, the deliberate and
premeditated character of its publication and the persistence of the
defamatory conduct are factors to be considered in determining
whether a publication is libel rather than slander." 28 Logically the
21 Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932).22 Ohio Public Service Co. v. Myers, 54 Ohio App. 40, 6 N. E. 2d 29 (1934).23 Weglein v. Golder, 317 Pa. 437, 177 Ati. 47 (1935).
2 4 RsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 568(f) (1938).
258 HowSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 335, 346 (1926); see
Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 364, 128 Eng. Rep. 367, 371 (C. P.
1812); Jones v. Jones, [1916] 2 A. C. 481, 500; Foulger v. Newcomb, L. R.
2 Ex. 327, 330 (1867).26 De Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5 Bing. 392, 130 Eng. Rep. 1112 (C. P.
1829); see also Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 364, 128 Eng. Rep. 367,
371 (C. P. 1812).27 See Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225, 226, 23 L. ed. 308, 310 (1875).
. (1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the
commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude, for which the
party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished. (2) Words falsely
spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected with some con-
tagious disease, where, if the charge is true, it would exclude the party from
society. (3) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which impute to
the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment of profit,
or the work of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such an office or
employment. (4) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which preju-
dice such party in his or her profession or trade. (5) Defamatory words
falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion
the party special damage. . ..
In New York, RuLEs OF Crm PRAc-nc, Rule 97: "In an action of slander
brought by a woman for words imputing unchastity to her, it is not necessary
to allege or prove special damages."28 RsTATEMENT, ToRTs § 568(3) (1938).
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broadcast of a defamatory remark would seem to be as potentially
harmful as a mere publication contained in a writing, or as not less
in capacity for damage than the classifications of slander for which
no special damage need be proved. Logic and policy, as enunciated
by Mr. Justice Fuld, point to the conclusion that defamation by radio
should be actionable per se, eliminating the difficult problem which
confronts courts where the defamation is the result of a broadcast. 29
A. J. S.
PROPERTY IN IDEAS - ORIGINAL AND CONCRETE - CONTRACT,
ExPREss OR ImPL ED.-This is an action for damages based upon a
breach of a contract by which plaintiff agreed to disclose his process
for manufacturing laminated canvas soles, and to instruct defendant
in the use of said process. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiff 10% of
the selling price realized from the sales of such soles. Thereafter
the process was adopted and used by defendant in manufacturing that
type of sole, but the defendant nevertheless has neglected and refused
to remunerate plaintiff at the stipulated rate, prompting him to in-
stitute this action. The defense interposed, inter alia, is that plaintiff
is not entitled to recover because the process was not new or novel;
and that no one can have a proprietary interest in ideas well known
to others. Held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed. The recovery is
justified on the theory that plaintiff did have a property right in the
formula which he disclosed to defendant as the subject matter of
their agreement. Schonwald v. Burkart Manufacturing Co., - Mo.
-, 202 S. W. 2d 7 (1947).
The court reasoned that, just as ownership of wild animals de-
pends entirely upon keeping them in captivity, so too does ownership
of ideas ordinarily depend on non-disclosure. And as the ownership
of a beast terminates with its escape,' in like manner ownership of
an idea ends by disclosure. However, when ideas are embodied in a
concrete plan for accomplishing a desired result, the one who con-
ceived the plan has a right to contract with reference to its disclosure,
even though he did not originate it in the sense that no one else ever
had similar ideas. This case does not turn on an unauthorized use
of an asserted property right in a disclosed idea, but rather on a
promise to pay for its authorized use.
As a general proposition, in the absence of an express agreement,
the originator or proprietor of an abstract idea which cannot be sold,
appropriated or used without disclosure, cannot hold liable one who
29 SEE.mAN, THE Lw oF LIEL AND SLANDER IN THE STATE OF Naw
YoRx 3 (1933).1 Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. 42, 43 (N. Y. 1835).
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